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Abstract—The real-time traffic monitoring is a fundamental
mission in a smart city to understand traffic conditions and
avoid dangerous incidents. In this paper, we propose a reliable
and efficient traffic monitoring system that integrates blockchain
and the Internet of vehicles technologies effectively. It can
crowdsource its tasks of traffic information collection to vehicles
that run on the road instead of installing cameras in every corner.
First, we design a lightweight blockchain-based information
trading framework to model the interactions between traffic
administration and vehicles. It guarantees reliability, efficiency,
and security during executing trading. Second, we define the
utility functions for the entities in this system and come up
with a budgeted auction mechanism that motivates vehicles to
undertake the collection tasks actively. In our algorithm, it not
only ensures that the total payment to the selected vehicles does
not exceed a given budget, but also maintains the truthfulness of
auction process that avoids some vehicles to offer unreal bids for
getting greater utilities. Finally, we conduct a group of numerical
simulations to evaluate the reliability of our trading framework
and performance of our algorithms, whose results demonstrate
their correctness and efficiency perfectly.
Index Terms—Internet of vehicle, Lightweight blockchain,
Reliability, Budgeted auction mechanism, Truthfulness.
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR the past few years, vehicles have been getting smarterwith the progress of technology by installing camera
sensors, microcomputers, and communication devices [1] [2].
These vehicles are connected with themselves and other
facilities to form a vehicular network. Due to its potential
commercial value, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has become
a hot topic that attracts the attention of academia and industry.
The IoV provides a convenient platform for information ex-
change and sharing between users, such as traffic accidents
and road conditions, which can improve the utilization of
resources and traffic conditions effectively [3]. However, too
many mobile and variable entities are involved in the vehicular
network, they are usually strangers and do not trust each other.
Because of that, information exchange in the IoV still face
huge challenges about how to ensure information security and
privacy protection in real applications.
The advent of blockchain technology makes it possible to
change all of this. Blockchain is a public and distributed
database which entered people’s sight since Nakamoto pub-
lished his white paper in 2008 [4]. Blockchain takes advantage
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of the knowledge of modern cryptography and distributed
consensus protocol to achieve the purpose of security and
privacy protection. Here, the digital signature is an effective
means to achieve identity authentication and avoid information
leakage, while the consensus protocol allows information to
interact freely among users who do not trust each other
without the need for a third platform. Thus, it can be used
to construct a reliable information trading system because of
its decentralization, security, and anonymity [5] [6]. Despite
this, how to design a reasonable blockchain structure based
on the vehicle network, improve the efficiency of information
exchange, and guarantee the truthfulness of pricing strategies
is still a problem worthy of in-depth discussion.
In this paper, we consider such a scenario: In a smart
city, there is a traffic administration (TA) that is responsi-
ble for monitoring real-time traffic conditions by collecting
information of various road nodes in this city. The traditional
approach is to install cameras at various road nodes, but doing
so is costly and vulnerable to be damaged by natural and
human activities. Especially in some remote corners, there is
no need to install a separate camera. Driven by the IoV, the TA
can crowdsource its tasks of traffic information collection to
vehicles running on the road. Based on that, we need to study
the traffic information exchange between TA and vehicles in
a smart city. There are two challenges shown as follows: (1)
how to construct a reliable and efficient traffic information
trading framework implemented by blockchain?; and (2) how
to build a fair and truthful mechanism that selects a subset of
vehicles as information providers to maximize the TA’s profit
while preventing vicious competition?
To settle the first challenge, we propose a blockchain-
based real-time traffic monitoring (BRTM) system to achieve
a reliable and efficient information trading process between
TA and vehicles. First, we use modern cryptography methods
and digital signature techniques to protect the contents of
communication from privacy leakage. In addition to this, the
traditional proof-of-work (PoW) consensus mechanism cannot
be applied to our resource-limited vehicle network because
of its high computational cost and slow confirmation speed
[7]. Thus, we design a lightweight blockchain relied on the
reputation-based delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) consensus
mechanism that is able to reduce confirmation time and
improve throughput for this system. Here, All the TAs of
different cities can be considered as the full nodes which are
interconnected with each other to complete the consensus pro-
cess. There is a reputation value associating with each TA in
the BRTM system, which reflects its behaviors in the previous
consensus rounds. A full node with a higher reputation value
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implies it has a higher voting weight and is more likely to
become the leader in the future consensus round, thus ensuring
the reliability and efficiency of the consensus process.
To settle the second challenge, we propose a budgeted
auction mechanism so as to incentivize the vehicles in a city
to take on the tasks issued by the TA actively. Here, the TA
publishes a task set that contains a number of different tasks
about traffic information on various locations. Each active
vehicle in this city submits the tasks that it can accomplish
and corresponding bid to the TA, then the TA selects a winner
set from these active vehicles to undertake its tasks and pay
them accordingly. We aim to maximize the TA’s profit by
selecting an optimal winner set, which can be categorized
as a non-monotone submodular maximization problem with
knapsack constraint. The simple greedy strategy can give us
a valid solution, but it does not satisfy the truthfulness. If
no truthfulness, a vehicle may increase its utility by offering a
higher bid or colluding with other vehicles, which will damage
the fairness and effectiveness of the auction mechanism. Thus,
we design a truthful budgeted selection and pricing (TB-
SAP) algorithm that can guarantee the individual rationality,
profitability, truthfulness, and computational efficiency for the
budgeted auction mechanism.
Finally, the effectiveness of our proposed mechanisms is
evaluated by numerical simulations. It is shown that our
proposed mechanisms can enhance the reliability of the
blockchain system by urging the nodes to behave rightfully
and make sure that the information trading is fair and truthful.
To our best knowledge, this is the first time to put forward a
reliable blockchain-based traffic monitoring system in a vehic-
ular network that is based on a budgeted auction mechanism
to maximize the profit. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows: In Sec. II, we discuss the-state-of-art work. In Sec.
III, we introduce our traffic monitoring system and define
the utility functions. In Sec. IV, we present our design of
lightweight blockchain elaborately. In Sec. V, we propose a
truthful budgeted auction mechanism. Then we evaluate our
proposed system and algorithms by numerical simulations in
Sec.VI and show the conclusions in Sec. VII.
II. RELATED WORK
With the development of Internet of Things (IoT), vehicles
are no longer isolated individuals, but nodes in a connected
network, which lead to the formation of the IoV [8]. Then,
the IoV has been developed further due to the progress of
computing power and modern communication devices. Kai-
wartya et al. [8] provided us with an IoV framework that
focused on networking architecture mainly. Singh et al. [9]
presented an abstract network model for the IoV and related
with different services relied on popular technologies. Ji et
al. [10] designed a novel network structure for the future
IoV and gave a comprehensive review of the basic IoV
information, which included several network architectures and
representative applications of IoV.
In recent years, the rise of blockchain technology over-
turned the operating mode of the traditional IoT, thereby
the blockchain-based IoT has promoted changes in trading
methods. Firstly, in energy trading, Li et al. [11] designed
a secure energy trading system, energy blockchain, for the in-
dustrial IoT relied on consortium blockchain and credit-based
payment scheme. Guo et al. [12] [13] proposed a blockchain-
based distributed multiple energies trading framework to ad-
dress security and privacy protection. Xia et al. [14] came
up with a blockchain-enabled vehicle-to-vehicle electricity
trading scheme that exploited Bayesian game pricing to deal
with incomplete information sharing. Secondly, in computing
resource trading, Yao et al. [15] studies a resource manage-
ment problem between the cloud server and miners since the
computational power of industrial IoT was limited. Ding et
al. [16] created a mechanism for the blockchain platform to
attract lightweight devices to purchase more computational
power from edge servers for participating in mining. Finally,
in information trading, Wang et al. [17] designed and realized
a securer and more reliable government information sharing
system by combining blockchain, network model, and consen-
sus algorithm. Xu et al. [18] devised a blockchain-based big
data sharing framework that was appropriate for the resource-
limited devices. Chen et al. [19] proposed a blockchain-based
data trading framework that relied on consortium blockchain
to achieve secure and truthful data trading for IoV. However,
they did not really achieve reliability and ignored the high
latency of the consensus process. In this paper, our trading
model is different from either of the provious ones and attempt
to design a secure and reliable system carefully.
The auction mechanism, as a technique of game theory,
has been used to solve the allocation and pricing problems in
a variety of applications, such as mobile crowdsensing [20]
[21], edge computing [22] [23], and spectrum trading [24]
[25]. Zhang et al. [20] surveyed the diverse incentive strategies
that encouraged users to take part in mobile crowdsourcing.
Yang et al. [21] designed two crowdsourcing models under
the framework of the Stackelberg game and reverse auction
theory respectively. Kaini [22] put forward and solved an
auction-based profit maximization problem under the back-
ground of the hierarchical model. Jiao et al. [23] proposed an
auction-based market model for computing resource allocation
between the edge server and miners. Zhu et al. [24] devised a
truthful double auction mechanism for cooperative sensing in
radio networks. Zheng et al. [25] achieved a social welfare
maximization problem by re-distributing wireless channels,
while they took the strategy-proof into consideration as well.
In this paper, our proposed auction mechanism is similar to
that under the mobile crowdsourcing, but there is a budgeted
constraint in our model that constrains the range of the winner
set. Therefore, both the theoretical analysis and applicable
scope are different from the previous work.
III. TRAFFIC MONITORING SYSTEM
In this section, we introduce our traffic monitoring system
including network model and utility functions for the entities.
A. Network Model
Consider a smart city, there is a traffic administration (TA)
that is responsible for monitoring real-time traffic condition
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Fig. 1. An instance of BRTM system built on the United States, where the
orange lines are active vehicles’ requests to undertake the tasks and the black
line are TA’s acceptances for corresponding requests.
in this city. It can crowdsource its tasks of traffic information
collection to vehicles on the road by paying them a certain
amount of money. Therefore, the blockchain-based real-time
traffic monitoring (BRTM) system consists of two important
entities: TA and vehicle, which is shown in Fig. 1. In the
BRTM system, the functionality of the entities in a smart city
Sa, a ∈ Z+, can be shown as follows:
Traffic administration (TA): The TA in the city Sa can be
denoted by TAa, which collects the real-time traffic infor-
mation from those vehicles running in this city. For instance,
during peak time, traffic accidents often occur on some heavily
trafficked roads. At this time, the TAa needs to analyze road
conditions instantly according to the responses provided by
those vehicles that run on the designated location. If TAa
adopts the information provided by some vehicles, it must
pay them with data coins. Here, data coin is a kind of digital
currency considered as the payment for traffic information.
Vehicles: The vehicles in this system are installed with cam-
era sensors, wireless communication devices, and microcom-
puter systems, which are able to collect, process, and transmit
data to other corresponding devices. The active vehicles in the
city Sa can be denoted by a set Va = {va1, va2, · · · , vab, · · · },
where active vehicles are those participating in information
trading with TAa and idle vehicles do not want to share their
traffic information. Once a transaction between TAa and vab
has been completed and validated, the vehicle vab will receive
a certain number of data coins from TAa.
Based on that, a smart city in our BRTM system can be
denoted by Sa = (TAa, Va), and the whole BRTM system S
can be denoted by S = {S1, S2, · · · , Sa, · · · }. It is very easy
to understand, for example, this system can be constructed in
a country that is composed of a number of smart cities. Here,
all TAs that serve under the cities in S are interconnected with
each other to make up a peer-to-peer (P2P) wide-area network.
We take Fig. 1 as an instance to demonstrate it.
Example 1. Shown as the upper part in Fig. 1, there is a TA in
the Dallas city that announces a number of traffic information
collection tasks across the important intersections of the whole
city. Some vehicles in this city request to undertake part of
tasks at a certain price. For a vehicle, whether its request
can be accepted is decided by the TA according to the TA’s
evaluation. Then, a BRTM system is built on the United States,
shown as the lower part in Fig. 1. The four main cities, Los
Angeles, Chicago, New York, and Dallas are interconnected
with each other to form a large network.
The P2P network among the TAs in the BRTM sys-
tem is used for constructing the blockchain network. Here,
blockchain is an effective technique to record the transactions
and guarantee the security. In our blockchain network, there
are two types of nodes which are full node and lightweight
node. For the full nodes, they not only executes the consensus
process to validate the candidate block but also manages stores
the blockchain that contains the whole transactions between
TA and vehicles. For the lightweight nodes, they merely store
the block headers that is convenient for them to check and
verify. In our system S, each TAa of Sa ∈ S is defaulted as
a full node and each vehicle vab ∈ Va of Sa ∈ S is defaulted
as a lightweight node because of lacking enough storage and
computational power. Details of the blockchain design will be
described in Sec. IV.
B. Definitions of Utility functions
Consider a smart city S = (TA, V ) such that S ∈ S at
some point, we neglect the subscripts and denote by V =
{v1, v2, · · · , vn} for convenience. This traffic administration
TA releases a task set T = {t1, t2, · · · , tm} about traffic
information for the active vehicles to undertake. For the TA,
there is an appraisement aj for each task tj ∈ T . For each
vehicle vi ∈ V , it can attempt to finish a subset of tasks Ti ⊆ T
based on its ability and willingness. The cost of Ti for the vi
can be defined as ci, which is private and not known to the TA.
Then, the vehicle vi determines a bid bi and respones the TA
with its bid-task pair (Ti, bi), where bi is vi’s reserve price that
is the lowest price it want to undertake the tasks Ti. Generally,
we have Ti∩Tj 6= ∅ for any vehicle vi and vj . Here, for each
task ti ∈ T , we can quantify it as the traffic information at
some position in this city, thereby an active vehicle is able
to submit a subset of tasks based on its running path. After
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Fig. 2. The traffic information trading framework between TA and vehicles.
receiving the responses from all active vehicles, the TA needs
to select a winner (acceptance) set W ⊆ V and give a payment
pi for each vi ∈W . The utility for a vehicle vi ∈ V is
Ui =
{
pi − ci, if vi ∈W
0, if vi /∈W
(1)
The profit of the TA is
P (W ) = A(W )−
∑
vi∈W
pi (2)
where we denote by A(W ) =
∑
tj∈∪vi∈WTi aj . Besides, in
order to control cost, the TA has a total budget B such that∑
vi∈W bi ≤ B. Based on that, we want to design an incentive
mechanism to execute this auction process.
IV. LIGHTWEIGHT BLOCKCHAIN DESIGN
In a smart city, the TA publishs a task set first, then those
active vehicles in this city request to undertake part of tasks. If
a vehicle’s request is accepted by the TA, it will get a certain
number of rewards. With the help of the blockchain technol-
ogy, the TA can trade the traffic information with the active
vehicles in a decentralized, secure, and verifiable manner. In
the meantime, a budgeted auction mechanism is written in the
smart contract. When a new round of trading begins, the smart
contract in our BRTM system will be deployed and executed
automatically in order to find the optimal profit for the TA
according to the vehicles’ requests.
A. System Initialization
Consider a smart city S = (TA, V ), each vehicle vi ∈ V
has to register with the certificate authority (CA) through
correlating its license plate so as to acquire a unique iden-
tification IDi. Then, each legitimate vehicle will be assigned
with a private/public key pair (SKi, PKi), where the private
key is reserved by itself and the public key is known by
all the legitimate nodes in the blockchain as a pseudonym.
The asymmetric encryption are adopted widely in the current
blockchain technology for the sake of data integrity. The data
encrypted by the private (resp. public) key can be decrypted by
the public (resp. private) key. After registering, the vehicle vi
will obtain a certificate Ceri signed by CA’s private key that
can certify the authenticity of its identity. There is an account
Ai = {IDi, Ceri, (SKi, PKi), Bi} associated with the vi ∈
V where Bi is its data coin balance. Similarly, the TA has an
account denoted by A∗ = {ID′, Cer′, (SK ′, PK ′), B′, Rep′}
as well, where Rep′ is its reputation value which will be
introduce later. If a round of trading is finished successfully,
data coins will be transferred from B∗ to Bi.
B. Information Trading Framework
The elaborate process of traffic information trading in our
BRTM system are drawn in Fig. 2, whose specific operation
steps are summarized as follows:
1) The TA publishs its task set T across the active vehi-
cles in this city. The published message can be denoted by
PubMsg = {SK ′(T ), Cer′, ST ime}, where is the task set
is encrypted by the TA’s private key for security and STime
is the time stamp of this message generation.
2) After receiving the PubMsg from the TA, each active
vehicle vi ∈ V in this city has to verify the TA’s certification
Cer′ by the CA’s public key and then read the task set by
the TA’s public key. Once verified, each vi will determine its
task-bid pair (Ti, bi) and send its request message ReqMsg,
denoted by ReqMsg = {PK ′(Ti, bi), Ceri, ST ime}, back to
the TA. Here, its task-bid pair is encrypted by the TA’s public
key because it can only be read by the TA for privacy.
3) The TA waits to collect all the ReqMsg from the
active vehicles in this city, then determine the winner set W
and its corresponding payment pi for vi ∈ W . This process
is executed by the built-in smart contract, which adopts a
budgeted auction mechanism explained in Sec. V.
4) The TA sends the order message to each accepted
vehicle vi ∈ W , which can be denoted by OrdMsg =
{PKi(pi), Cer′, ST ime}. Here, the payment is encrypted by
the vi’s public key which can be read by the vi merely.
5) If receiving the OrdMsg from the TA, it means that the
vi has been selected as an information provider. Then, the vi
can read it by its private key and send the response message
that includes the traffic information associated with task Ti,
denoted by ResMsg = {PK ′(data), Ceri, ST ime}, back to
the TA. The data is encrypted by the TA’s public key due to
the same reason as (2).
6) After the data transmission, the TA will check and
confirm whether the traffic information about task Ti from
the vi meets its requirement. If yes, the TA pays the data
coins pi to the vi’s public wallet address.
7) Once receiving the payment from the TA, the vi
will sends the confirm message, denoted by ConMsg =
{PK ′(Confirm), Ceri, ST ime}, back to the TA. The TA
will sign it with a confirm message as well, then a transaction
record is formulated until now.
8) The built-in smart contract in the TA will record a series
of transactions between TA and vehicles in this city within a
period of time, and package them into a new block. Before
this block is added into the blockchain, it has to be reached
a consensus among all the TAs in the BRTM system. The
consensus process we adopt here is called as reputation-based
delegated proof-of-work (DPoS) mechanism explained in Sec.
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IV.C. After finishing the consensus process, this block will
be appended into the blockchain in a linear and chronological
order permanently.
C. Reputation-based DPoS Mechanism
A consensus process is essential to guarantee the consis-
tency and security for the blockchain system. The classic
PoW consensus mechanism is not suitable to our system
because of lacking the necessary computational power in the
vehicular networks. Therefore, we design a novel reputation-
based DPoS mechanism that not only ensures reliability but
also improves performance. Just as said before, all the TAs in
the BRTM system S are considered as the full nodes, thereby
the consensus process can be carried out among them. The
operational steps are displayed as follows:
1) Witness election: Denote by the full node set Z =
{TA1, TA2, · · · , TAa, · · · }, there is a reputation value Repa
associated with each full node TAa ∈ Z. This reputation
Repa can be considered as its stake that determines its voting
weight directly. It implies that the nodes with higher reputation
values can determine the results more than those with lower
reputation values. At each witness election epoch, the voting
result Ra for each TAa ∈ Z is defined as
Ra =
∑
TAa′∈Z\{TAa}
Repa′ · I(a, a′) (3)
where the I(a, a′) is an indicator. Here, I(a, a′) = 1 if the
TAa′ votes to support TAa, otherwise I(a, a′) = 0. All
these reputation values and voting results are stored in the
blockchain, thereby each node can check them by itself. We
select a witness committee M ⊆ Z that have the top |M|
highest voting results. Then, it can be divided into two part
such that M = D ∪ E and D ∩ E = ∅, where the full node
in D is an active witness and in E is a standby witness. The
active witnesses have the top |D| highest voting results, which
are able to generate a new block like a leader. However, the
standby witnesses can only verify and broadcast the block
generated by an active witness.
2) Block generation: First, the active witnesses in the set
D are sorted in a random sequence. Then, each TAa ∈ D
takes turn to be a leader round by round based on this sorting
that is responsible for generating a new block. The leader has
to verify and check all the transactions occurred recently and
package those valid transactions into a new block. If a node
in its turn does not produce a block over a given period of
time successfully, it will be skipped and have no chance to be
leader again in this election epoch. After passing |D| consensus
rounds, namely an election epoch, we re-execute the witness
election to elect a new witness committee M according to the
new reputation values of the full nodes in Z.
3) Consensus process: After producing a new block, the
leader should broadcast it to all witnesses in M. All witnesses
should verify the leader’s identity and check this block, then
broadcast their verification results signed by their private key.
Next, each witness TAa ∈ M compares its verified outcome
with those from other witnesses. If confirmed, it will send
a confirmation message to the leader, which means that this
witness agrees to accept the new block. For the leader, it will
append the new block into the blockchain if the proportion
of witnesses that agree to accept this block is more than
two thirds. All the full nodes should synchronize their local
blockchain storage according to the longest chain principle
and all the lightweight node should update their blockchain
headers based on the newest one.
4) Reputation update: When a consensus round is finished
or interrupted, we need to update the reputation values of
the full nodes in Z according to their behaviors during this
consensus round. Generally, the positive behaviors contribute
to the accumulation of reputation, but the negative behaviors
had a bad effect. We denote by Repa(i) the repuation value
of the full node TAa ∈ Z at the i-th consensus round. At the
i-th consensus round, we define
∆a(i) = A · αa(i) +B · βa(i) + C · γa(i) (4)
for each full node TAa ∈ Z. Here, if the TAa ∈ Z participates
the voting in witness election, we give αa(i) = 1, otherwise
αa(i) = −1. When the TAa is the leader at this consensus
round, we give βa(i) = 1 if it generates a new block that is
accepted by other witnesses eventually, otherwise βa(i) = −1.
If the TAa ∈ Z\{leader} is not the leader, we give βa(i) =
0. When the TAa ∈ M\{leader} is a member of witness
committee but not the leader, we give γa(i) = 1 if it verifies
the block produced by the leader correctly, otherwise γa(i) =
−1. If the TAa ∈ Z\M is not a witness, we give γa(i) = 0.
Then, the A, B, and C are three adjustable parameters that
represent the rewards or punishments of voting, leader, and
verification behaviors. Based on its behaviors ∆a(i) at the i-
th consensus round, we define the reputation value of the full
node TAa ∈ Z as
Repa(i) =
{
max{1, Repa(i− 1) + ∆a(i)}, if ∆a(i) ≥ 0
min{0, Repa(i− 1) + ∆a(i)}, if ∆a(i) < 0
where the TAa’s voting is meaningless when its reputation
down to zero according to the (3). Moveover, we initialize
the reputation Repa(0) = 0.5 for each TAa ∈ Z and make
B > C > A > 0 because of their importance.
D. Performance and Reliability
Our BRTM system inherits the advantages of blockchain
technology which helps to ensure the reliability of traffic
information trading and privacy protection. Its main charac-
teristics are summarized as follows: (1) Decentralization: the
traffic information trading can be performed in a distributed
manner without relying on the third trusted intermediaries,
which avoids single point failure; (2) Reliability: when there
is a node failing because of malicious attacks, the blockchain
network can be guaranteed to work as usual; (3) Privacy
protection: shown as Sec. IV.B, asymmetric encryption is used
to prevent the message from reading by others, which makes
the private message remain confidential during the auction
process; (4) Efficiency: our reputation-based DPos mechanism
not only makes the consensus process more reliable but also
improves efficiency by screening out the trustworthy nodes in
advance; (5) Transaction authentication: all transaction must
be checked and verified by the witness before appending into
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the blockchain, thereby it is extremely hard to dominate the
majority of witnesses to create an unreal block. Based on that,
our BRTM system provides us with a secure, reliable, and
efficient traffic information trading platform.
V. BUDGETED AUCTION INCENTIVE MECHANISM
In this section, we consider how to model the trading
process between TA and vi ∈ V in a smart city S = (TA, V ).
Auction mechanism is an execellent theoretical tool for this
scenario. Here, the sellers are V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn} and the
buyer is TA. Each seller vi submits a task-bid pair (Ti, bi),
and then the buyer determine whether to accept its request. If
accept it, the buyer need to offer a payment. We call such an
auction as “reverse auction”. Thus, the single round auction
mechanism can be formulated as Problem 1.
Problem 1. The active vehicles in S given a task-bid pair vec-
tor ((T1, b1), (T2, b2), · · · , (Tn, bn)), the TA need to compute
an allocation W and payments {pi}vi∈W such that
max
W⊆V
P (W ) s.t.
∑
vi∈W
bi ≤ B (5)
where it satisfies individual rationality, profitability, truthful-
ness, and computational efficiency.
The auction we use in this section is a single sealed-bid
auction, thereby the task-bid pair given by each seller is private
and not known to other sellers in order to avoid collaborating
or forming an alliance. Once submitted, any seller can not
change its task or bid during the auction. This is why we use
asymmetric encryption in Sec. IV.B.
Definition 1 (Individual rationality). A reverse auction is
individual rational if there is no winning sellers getting less
than its cost.
For each vehicle vj ∈ V , it must have an non-negative
utility that is pi ≥ ci if vi ∈W .
Definition 2 (Profitability). The profit of an reverse auction is
the difference between the value generated by winner set and
the payment to the sellers, which is nonnegative.
For the TA in S, it has an allocation W such that∑
tj∈∪vi∈WTi aj ≥
∑
vi∈W pi.
Definition 3 (Truthfulness). A reverse auction is truthful if
every seller’s bid, which is the same as its truthful cost, is the
dominant strategy that maximizes its utility.
For each vehicle vi ∈ V , it means that the vi cannot
increase its utility by giving a bid bi that is different from its
truthful cost ci no matter what others’ bids are. Truthfulness
is a very important property for an auction mechanism to
avoid malicious price manipulation as well as ensure a fair
and benign market competition environment. In our case, if a
vehicle can obtain a better utility when offering an untruthful
bid, then those malicious vehicles are able to cheat in the
auction that benefit themselves but hurt the interests of others.
By making all active vehicles bidding truthfully, the TA can
allocate its tasks to the most suitable vehicles. Therefore,
truthfulness plays a very significant role in our auction design.
Definition 4 (Computational efficiency). A reverse auction is
efficient if it can be done in ploynomial time.
A. Submodular Maximization
Assume the TA gives a payment pi with pi = bi for
each vehicle vi ∈ V , the Problem 1 can be reduced to
an optimization problem, called “budgeted vehicle allocation
problem”, that selects a winner set W ⊆ V such that P¯ (W )
is maximized. We denote
P¯ (W ) = A(W )−
∑
vi∈W
bi (6)
where
∑
vi∈W bi ≤ B. To be meaningful, we assume P¯ (∅) =
0 and it exists at least one vehicle vk ∈ V such that
P¯ ({vk}) > 0 with bk ≤ B. However, the budgeted vehicle
allocation problem can be reduced to the classic set cover
problem in polynomial time, thereby it is NP-hard to find the
optimal solution definitely. Based on that, we have to seek
help from designing an approximation algorithm which will
make use of submodularity of objective shown in (6).
Definition 5 (Submodular function [26]). Given a set function
f : 2V → R, it is submodular if
f(X ∪ {u})− f(X) ≤ f(Y ∪ {u})− f(Y ) (7)
for any X ⊆ Y ⊆ V and u ∈ V \Y .
Lemma 1. The objective function of budgeted vehicle alloca-
tion problem P¯ is submodular.
Proof. According to the (6), to show P¯ (X ∪{vi})− P¯ (X) ≤
P¯ (Y ∪ {vi}) − P¯ (Y ) is equivalent to show A(X ∪ {vi}) −
A(X) ≤ A(Y ∪ {vi}) − A(Y ) for any X ⊆ Y ⊆ V and
vi ∈ V \Y . We have A(X ∪ {vi})−A(X) =
=
∑
ti∈Ti\∪vj∈XTj
ai ≥
∑
ti∈Ti\∪vj∈Y Tj
ai (8)
= A(Y ∪ {vi})−A(Y ) (9)
Therefore, P¯ is submodular.
As we known, Buchbinder et al. [27] designed a double
greedy algorithm for the unconstrained submodular maximiza-
tion problem with a (1/3)-approximation under the determin-
istic setting and a (1/2)-approximation under the randomized
setting. Back to our budgeted vehicle allocation problem, there
is a constraint
∑
vi∈W bi ≤ B that is a knapsack constraint.
This constraint affects the resulting profit obtained by the TA
and the number of vehicles that are selected as winners in
the auction. Thus, a valid reverse auction mechanism design
are required to ensure the truthfulness carefully. Based on
the aforementioned analysis, this optimization problem can
be catagorized to a non-monotone submodular maximiza-
tion with knapsack constraint. Lee et al. [28] proposed a
(1/5 − )-approximation algorithm to maximize any non-
negative submodular function with knapsack constraint by
means of fractional relaxation and local search method. Even
though this algorithm can give us a constant approximation
ratio, its process is complex and its performance is worse than
the greedy-heuristic algorithm actually. The greedy-heuristic
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 greedy-heuristic
Input: Function P¯ , bids {bi}vi∈V , and budget B
Output: Winner set W
1: Initialize: W ← ∅, s← 0
2: Initialize: F ← {vi : vi ∈ V \W and bi ≤ B}
3: while F 6= ∅ do
4: Select v∗ such that v∗ ∈ arg maxvi∈F {P¯ (vi|W )/bi}
5: if P¯ (v∗|W ) < 0 then
6: Break
7: end if
8: W ←W ∪ {v∗}
9: s← s+ b∗
10: F ← {vi : vi ∈ V \W and bi ≤ B − s}
11: end while
12: return W
Here, we denote by P¯ (vi|W ) = P¯ (W ∪{vi})− P¯ (W ) and
b∗ is the bid offered by vehicle v∗. Shown as Algorithm 1,
we select a vehicle v∗ from the current constrained set F with
maximum unit marginal gain until P¯ (v∗|W ) < 0 or F = ∅.
Despite the winner set returned by Algorithm 1 has no any
theoretical bounds because of non-monotonicity and knapsack
constraint, it is intuitive and has a good performance in the
practical applications. Now, we have to explore whether the
greedy-heuristic satisfies the aforementioned four properties in
the reverse auction mechanism.
Next, let us look at whether the greedy-heuristic satisfies
profitability, individual rationality, truthfulness, and computa-
tional efficiency one by one as follows:
1) Individual rationality: The TA pay each vehicle in the
winner set its bid, thus it is individually rational.
2) Profitability: Form line 5 in Algorithm 1, the while loop
is terminated when there is no vehicle having postive marginal
gain, which guarantee P¯ (W ) > 0.
3) Truthfulness: Let us consider an example. There are five
tasks issued by the TA, denoted by T = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5},
with appraisement {a1 = 2, a2 = 3, a3 = 4, a4 = 2, a5 = 5}
and the budget B = 5. There are three active vehicles denoted
by V = {v1, v2, v3} in this city. They want to undertake
the TA’s tasks as T1 = {t1, t3, t5}, T2 = {t1, t2, t5},
T3 = {t3, t4, t5}, c1 = 2, c2 = 2, and c3 = 2. When
each vehicle offers a bid truthfully, we have P¯ ({v1}|∅)/b1 =
(A({v1}) − b1)/b1 = (11 − 2)/2 = 4.5. Similarly, we have
P¯ ({v2}|∅)/b2 = 4 and P¯ ({v3}|∅)/b3 = 3.5. Thus, vehicle
v1 is selected at the first iteration. At the second iteration,
we have P¯ (v2|{v1})/b2 = 0.5 and P¯ (v3|{v1})/b3 = 0. Thus,
vehicle v2 is selected at the second iteration. Then, the greedy-
heuristic terminates because the budget is exhausted. However,
when vehicle v2 offer an untruthful bid b2 = c2 + λ, we have
P¯ (v2|{v1})/b2 = 3/(2+λ)−1. If λ ∈ (0, 1), it will be selected
as the winner at the second iteration. The algorithm terminates
here and vehicle v2 can get more payment by offering an
untruthful bid, thus is does not satisfy truthfulness.
4) Computational efficiency: The running time of the
greedy-heuristic is O(Bnm/minvi∈V {bi}) because it takes
O(nm), |T | = m and |V | = n, to compute P¯ and iterates at
most B/minvi∈V {bi} times, so computationally efficient.
Algorithm 2 TBSAP Algorithm
Input: Function P¯ , bids {bi}vi∈V , and budget B
Output: Winner set W
1: // Winner allocation stage
2: Initialize: X ← ∅, s← 0
3: while X 6= V do
4: Select v∗ such that v∗ ∈ arg maxv∈V \X{Pˆ (v|X)}
5: if Pˆ (v∗|X) < 0 or s+ b∗ > B then
6: Break
7: end if
8: X ← X ∪ {v∗}
9: s← s+ b∗
10: end while
11: // Payment determination stage
12: for each vi ∈ X do
13: Initialize: Y0 ← ∅, s← 0, j ← 0
14: Initialize: pi ← −∞
15: while Yj 6= V−i do
16: vij+1 ← arg maxv∈V−i\Yj{Pˆ (v|Yj)}
17: if Pˆ (vij+1 |Yj) < 0 or s+ bi > B then
18: Break
19: end if
20: Yj+1 ← Yj ∪ {vij+1}
21: s← s+ bij+1
22: pi ← max
{
pi, bij+1 · A(vi|Yj)A(vij+1 |Yj)
}
23: j ← j + 1
24: end while
25: if s+ bi ≤ B then
26: pi ← max{pi, A(vi|Yj)}
27: end if
28: end for
29: return X and {pi}vi∈X
B. Truthful Auction Mechanism Design
As mentioned above, the greedy-heuristic algorithm is not
meaningful due to lacking truthfulness even though it simple to
implement. Thus, we have to design a budgeted reverse auction
mechanism that not only gets a good profit by encouraging
vehicles to undertake the tasks, but also satisfies the four
properties shown as before, especially for truthfulness, in
order to protect from manipulating this system malignantly
by offering a unreal bid. Therefore, a valid auction mechanism
needs to be designed although it may lose some of its profits.
We propose a truthful budgeted reverse auction mechanism
based on Myerson’s introduction [29].
Theorem 1 ([29]). An reverse auction mechanism is truthfully
if and only if it satisfies as follows: (1) Monotonicity: If a
vehicle (seller) vi ∈ V wins by its task-bid pair (Ti, bi), then
it will win by any bid that is smaller than bi with the same
task set Ti as well. Namely, the (Ti, b◦i ) will win by any bid
b◦i < bi when other sellers do not change their strategies;
(2) Critical payment: The payment pi of a winner vi with its
task-bid pair (Ti, bi) is the maximum bid with which the vi
can win. Namely, the (Ti, b◦i ) will not win by any bid b
◦
i > pi
when other sellers do not change their strategies.
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Based on the Theorem 1, we design our budgeted reverse
auction mechanism consisted of the winner allocation stage
and payment determination stage. From the bids {bi}vi∈V ,
we denote by the unit marginal gain Pˆ
Pˆ (vi|X) = P¯ (vi|X)/bi = [P¯ (X ∪ {vi})− P¯ (X)]/bi (10)
The winner allocation stage selects vehicles from V in a
greedy approach. All active vehicles in V are sorted in a non-
increasing sequence as
Pˆ (v1|X0) ≥ · · · ≥ Pˆ (vi|Xi−1) ≥ · · · ≥ Pˆ (vn|Xn−1) (11)
where the i-th vehicle has the maximum unit marginal gain
Pˆ (vi|Xi−1) over V \Xi−1, Xi−1 = {v1, v2, · · · , vi−1}, and
X0 = ∅. From this sorting, we select the maximum L with
L ≤ n such that Pˆ (vL|XL−1) ≥ 0 and
∑
vi∈XL bi ≤ B where
XL = {v1, v2, · · · , vL}.
According to the winner set XL, we have to determine
the payment price pi for each vehicle vi ∈ XL. The re-
verse auction mechanism runs the winner allocation process
repreatedly. Consider the vehicle vi ∈ V , all active vehicles in
V−i = V \{vi} are sorted in a non-increasing order as follows:
Pˆ (vi1 |Y0) ≥ Pˆ (vi2 |Y1) ≥ · · · ≥ Pˆ (vin−1 |Yn−2) (12)
where the ij-th vehicle has the maximum unit marginal gain
Pˆ (vij |Yj−1) over V \Yj−1, Yj−1 = {vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vij−1}, and
Y0 = ∅. From this sorting, we select the maximum Li with
Li ≤ n−1 such that Pˆ (viLi |YLi−1) ≥ 0 and
∑
vij∈YLi−1 bij+
bi ≤ B where YLi−1 = {vi1 , vi2 , · · · , viLi−1}. In short, there
is a list YLi = {vj1 , vj2 , · · · , viLi } associated with the vehicle
vi. For each position ij+1 in this list YLi , we can get the
maximum bid b′i(j+1) that the vehicle vi should offer in order
to replace vij+1 with vi at the position ij . To achieve it,
we have Pˆ (vi|Yj) ≥ Pˆ (vij+1 |Yj), which is equivalent to
[A(vi|Yj) − bi]/bi ≥ [A(vij+1 |Yj) − bij+1 ]/bij+1 . Thus, we
have the following inequality:
b′i(j+1) = bij+1 ·A(vi|Yj)/A(vij+1 |Yj) (13)
From here, we can achieve a list b′i = {b′i(1), b′i(2), · · · , b′i(Li)}
where each b′i(j) is the maximum bid to replace the vehicle
vij with vi in the list YLi . The vehicle vi can replace any
one in YLi without exceeding the budget B. Consider the
viLi+1 , it can be divided into the following three cases: (1)∑
vij∈YLi bij + bi > B; (2) Pˆ (viLi+1 |YLi) < 0; and (3)
Li = n−1 where viLi+1 does not exist and can be considered
as a virtual vehicle. For the case (1), the viLi+1 cannot be
replaced by the vi because of the budget constraint, thereby
we do not need to do anything. If not case (1), for the cases
(2) and (3), the bid by the vi should be less than A(vi|YLi) so
as to replace the viLi+1 , thereby the maximum bid to replace
the viLi+1 with vi is equal to A(vi|YLi). Therefore, for each
winner vi ∈ XL, we have
pi =
max{b
′
i}, if
∑
vij∈YLi
bij + bi > B
max{max{b′i}, A(vi|YLi)}, else
(14)
Based on the (14), a truthful budgeted selection and pricing
(TBSAP) algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Lemma 2. The TBSAP is individually rational.
Proof. Let vii be the vehicle vi’s replacement which appears
in the i-th position in the sorting (12) over V−i. Because
the vehicle vii cannot be in the i-th position when the
winner vi joins in this sorting. Thus, if i ≤ Li, we have
Pˆ (vi|Yi−1) ≥ Pˆ (vii |Yi−1) which results in bi ≤ bii ·
A(vi|Yi−1)/A(vii |Yi−1) ≤ pi. If i > Li or i does not exist,
we have bi ≤ A(vi|Xi−1) since the vi is a winner, and
bi ≤ A(vi|Xi−1) = A(vi|Yi−1) ≤ A(vi|YLi) ≤ pi because
of the submodularity.
Lemma 3. The TBSAP is profitable.
Proof. Recall that the vehicle vL is the last one that satisfies
A(vL|XL−1) ≥ bL in the sorting (11), we have the profit
P (XL) =
∑
1≤i≤LA(vi|Xi−1)−
∑
1≤i≤L pi according to the
(2), which is sufficient to show that A(vi|Xi−1) ≥ pi for each
1 ≤ i ≤ L. For each vehicle vi ∈ XL, we consider the two
sub-cases shown as follows:
Case 1: Recall that the vehicle viLi is the last one that satisfies
Pˆ (viLi |YLi−1) ≥ 0 and
∑
vij∈YLi−1 bij+bi ≤ B in the sorting
(12), we have pi = max{b′i} if
∑
vij∈YLi bij + bi > B. Thus,
we denote by
k = arg max
1≤j≤Li
{
b′i(1), · · · , b′i(j), · · · , b′i(Li)
}
(15)
Based on that, we have
pi = bik ·A(vi|Yk−1)/A(vik |Yk−1) ≤ A(vi|Yk−1) (16)
≤ A(vi|Xi−1) (17)
where the inequality (16) is because we have A(vik |Yk−1) ≥
bik . From the Lemma 2, we have bi ≤ pi. Consider a vehicle
vi ∈ XL with its bid bi, it cannot be moved forward in the
sorting (11) by increasing its bid. We can know that i ≤ k
and Xi−1 ⊆ Yk−1 due to the fact that Xj = Yj when j < i.
Therefore, we have A(vi|Yk−1) ≤ A(vi|Xi−1) because of its
submodularity, and the inequality (17) is established.
Case 2: Otherwise, we have pi = max{max{b′i}, A(vi|YLi)}
if
∑
vij∈YLi bij + bi ≤ B. Thus,
pi ≤ A(vi|YLi) ≤ A(vi|Xi−1) (18)
due to the similar analysis with the inequality (17). Combining
the case 1 and case 2, this lemma can be proven.
Lemma 4. The TBSAP is truthful.
Proof. According to the Theorem 1, it is sufficient to show that
our budgeted reverse auction mechanism satisfies the mono-
tonicity and critical payment. Let us look at the monotonicity
first. Consider a vehicle vi ∈ XL with its bid bi, it cannot
be moved backward in the sorting (11) by offer a lower bid
b◦i with b
◦
i < bi since A(vi|Xi−1)/b◦i > A(vi|Xi−1)/bi.
Therefore, if vi is a winner by offering a bid bi in the winner
allocation stage, it must be a winner by offering b◦i .
Then, we show the payment pi is the critical payment for the
vehicle vi where it cannot win this auction if giving a bid larger
than pi definitely. Based on the (14), when
∑
vij∈YLi bij+bi >
B, the vi must be able to replace one vehicle in YLi if it
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wants to be a winner. If the vi offers a bid b◦i larger than
pi = max{b′i}, we have
A(vi|Yj−1)/b◦i < A(vij |Yj−1)/bij for 1 ≤ j ≤ Li (19)
The vi cannot replace any one in YLi with bid b
◦
i , thereby it
cannot be a winner because of the budget constraint. Based
on the (14), when
∑
vij∈YLi bij + bi ≤ B, suppose the vi
can not replace any vehicle in YLi , it sill can be a winner if
A(vi|YLi) ≥ bi since there is residual budget. If the vi offers
a bid b◦i larger than pi = max{max{b′i}, A(vi|YLi)}, it not
only fail to replace any one in YLi according to the (19), but
also have b◦i > A(vi|YLi), thereby it cannot be a winner.
Lemma 5. The TBSAP is computationally efficient.
Proof. We have known that there are at most B/minvi∈V {bi}
winners and it takes O(Bnm/minvi∈V {bi}) to finish the
winner allocation stage where |T | = m and |V | =
n. Then, for each winner vi ∈ XL, a process similar
to the winner allocation stage needs to be executed that
takes O(Bnm/minvi∈V {bi}) running time as well. Thus,
the running time of the payment determination state is
O(B2nm/(minvi∈V {bi})2) which is the total time complexity
as well. The TBSAP can be done in polynomial time.
Theorem 2. The TBSAP, shown as Algorithm 2, is an effective
budgeted reverse auction mechanism to solve Problem 1 that
satisfies individual rationality, profitability, truthfulness, and
computational efficiency.
Proof. As indicated above, this theorem can be proved by
putting from Lemma 2 to Lemma 5 together.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of our
reputation-based DPoS mechanism, then test the correctness
and efficiency of our budgeted reverse auction algorithm. The
simulation setup and results will be displayed.
A. Simulation Setup
To evaluate the reputation-based DPoS mechanism, we need
to observe how different behaviors in a consensus round
affects its reputation value. Here, we take two full nodes as
an example to demonstrate it, where one is a normal node
that behaves legitimately and the other is an abnormal node
that sometimes makes some wrong behaviors, such as not
voting in witness election, producing an invalid block as the
leader, or verifying a block wrongly. Shown as the (4), we
give the parameters A = 0.005, B = 0.05, and C = 0.01.
Then, we compare our reputation-based DPoS with the general
DPoS mechanism whose each full node in Z is given by the
same voting weight. In other words, we do not consider their
reputation values in witness election of the general DPoS.
In these two DPoS mechanism, each normal full node TAa
votes to support TAa′ ∈ Z\{TAa} with Repa′ ≥ θ where
θ = 0.5 is a threshold. Conversely, we consider the most
extreme case where each abnormal full node TAa votes to
support TAa′ ∈ Z\{TAa} with Repa′ < θ. In our BRTM
system, we define the full node set with |Z| = 100 and
Fig. 3. The reputation values change with different behaviors of the two full
nodes in the consensus process.
Fig. 4. The ratio of normal witnesses (RNW) changes with the ratio of
abnormal full nodes (RAFN).
the witness committee with |M| = 70. To simulate a real
state, we give the reputation values of normal full nodes by
sampling from [0.5, 1] uniformly and abnormal full nodes by
sampling from [0, 0.5) uniformly. To evaluate the reliability
of this system, we define the ratio of abnormal full nodes
(RAFN) as “[# abnormal full nodes]/|Z|” and the ratio of
normal witnesses (RNW) as [# normal witnesses/M].
To simulate the budgeted reverse auction mechanism, we
consider a smart city S = (TA, V ) with a 1000m × 1000m
square area and the task set T issued by the TA are distributed
over this area. Then, the active vehicles V are distributed over
this area arbitrarily as well. For each vehicle vi ∈ V , its ability
to detect is different, thereby we assume there is a detection
distance di that is distributed in [10, 30] uniformly. It means
that the vi’s task set Ti contains all tasks whose distances from
the vi are less than di. Finally, the TA’s appraisement aj for
each task tj ∈ T is distributed in (0, 10] uniformly and the
cost of Ti for the vi can be denoted by ci = κ · |Ti| where the
parameter κ is distributed in (0, 5] uniformly.
B. Simulation Results and analysis
The simulation results about our reputation-based DPoS
mechanism are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
1) The impact of behavior on reputation: Fig. 3 draws the
reputation values change with different behaviors of the two
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Fig. 5. The performance obtained by greedy-heuristic and TBSAP algorithm
under the different budgets and number of vehicles.
Fig. 6. The distributions of bid and payment for each vehicle under the
different number of vehicles with budget B = 100
full nodes the consensus process. Shown as Fig. 3, we can see
that the repuation of the normal node is increased gradually
by its legitimate behaviors, but the reputation of the abnormal
node is decreased by its wrong behaviors. Here, we assume
there are 10 consensus rounds for each election epoch, namely
|D| = 10. To the normal node, it votes to elect witnesses
at the first election epoch (1-th to 10-th round), which adds
0.005 reputation per round. At the second epoch (11-th to 20-
th round), it is selected as a witness member because of its
good reputation. Thus, it votes and verifies the block correctly,
which adds 0.015 reputation per round. Especially, at the 15-th
consensus round, it becomes the leader that generates a block
successfully, which adds 0.055 reputation in this round. These
legitimate behaviors increase its reputation until approaching
1. To the abnormal node, it is selected as a witness member
at the third epoch (21-th to 30-th round). It does not vote
and verify the block, which reduces 0.015 reputation per
round. Especially, at the 15-th consensus round, it becomes the
leader that generates a block successfully, which adds 0.055
reputation in this round. Especially, at the 25-th consensus
round, it becomes the leader that generates an invalid block,
which reduces 0.055 reputation in this round.
2) Reliability: Fig. 4 draws the ratio of normal witnesses
changes with the ratio of abnormal full nodes, which describes
the reliability of our BRTM system. The higher the ratio of
normal witnesses is, the more reliable this system is. Shown
as Fig. 4, the ideal line is the maximum RNW we can obtain
theoretically. For instance, if RAFN is 0.6, namely there
are 60 abnormal full nodes, the optimal RNW is equal to
100 · (1 − 0.6)/70. The RNWs are all closed to the ideal
value when the RAFN is less than 0.5. This is because the
number of abnormal nodes is less than normal nodes, thereby
their voting hardly changes the outcome of witness election.
However, when the RAFN is from 0.5 to 0.75, the RNW
of our reputation-based DPoS is larger than that of general
DPoS obviously since the normal nodes have larger voting
weight even though their quantity is small in total. Therefore,
the reliability of our system is improved by the reputation-
based DPoS especially when the proportion of abnormal nodes
is higher and the most extreme case happens where each
abnormal node votes to support all abnormal nodes.
The simulation results about our budgeted reverse auction
mechanism are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
3) The TA’s profit function: Fig. 5 draws the performance
obtained by greedy-heuristic and TBSAP algorithm under the
different budgets and number of vehicles in this city, where
the number of vehicles |V | is 500 or 1000. Shown as Fig.
5, we can observe that the TA’s profit obtained by TBSAP is
less than that obtained by greedy-heuristic under any budget
in order to ensure the truthfulness. To the results obtained
by greedy-heuristic, we can observe the TA’s profit increases
as the budget increases. When the budget is larger than 200,
the TA’s profit keeps unchanged. There is a similar evolutive
trend in the results obtained by TBSAP, but it declines slightly
when the budget is larger than 200. At this time, none of the
optional vehicles has a positive unit marginal gain, thereby the
operation step in line 25 of Algorithm 2 is possible to increase
the payment and reduce the profit further.
4) Bids and payments: Fig. 6 draws the distributions of bid
and payment for each vehicle under the different number of
vehicles with a budget B = 100. Shown as Fig. 6, we can see
that the points are more concentrated on the bottom left which
have lower bids and payments when the number of vehicles
is larger. This is because there are more active vehicles with
lower bids that can be selected to undertake collection tasks.
It explains why the TA’s profit increases with the number of
vehicles in this city.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed and implemented a reliable
and efficient traffic monitoring system based on blockchain
technology and budgeted reverse auction mechanism. To en-
hance the security and reliability of this system, we gave a
lightweight information trading framework by using asymmet-
ric encryption. We devised a reputation-based DPoS consensus
mechanism so as to improve the efficiency of recording and
storing in blockchain. Then, to incentivize vehicles to under-
take collection tasks, we developed a budgeted reverse auc-
tion algorithm that satisfies individual rationality, profitability,
truthfulness, and computational efficiency. Finally, the results
of numerical simulations indicated that our model is valid, and
verify the correctness and efficiency of our algorithms.
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